JSA Examples: Completed Job Safety Analysis Samples

JSA preparation is a practical skill that is best learned by seeing completed examples rather than by reading theoretical descriptions. A blank JSA template shows the structure of the document but does not show the level of detail that a supervisor or inspector expects to see in the completed fields. A worked example fills in the gaps by demonstrating how an experienced preparer actually writes a hazard description, a control measure, a risk rating, and a PPE reference.

Three patterns distinguish good JSAs from generic ones. The first is specificity in the step description — each step describes a single action in the order it actually happens, not a broad phase of the task. The second is specificity in the hazard description — each hazard names the energy source, the mechanism, and the body part or system at risk rather than using vague labels like injury or electrical risk. The third is verifiability in the control measure — each control describes an action that a supervisor can check rather than a motherhood statement that cannot be objectively verified.

The worked examples below follow all three patterns. They are drawn from real work tasks that are common across Australian industry, adapted to remove any site-specific identifiers. They show the range of work types that JSAs are used for, from construction electrical work to industrial maintenance, and illustrate how the same methodology applies across different trades. After reading the examples, users should be able to recognise the patterns that make a JSA useful and apply them to their own task analysis.

A critical note: these examples are educational references, not ready-to-use documents. The Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 requires risk assessments to take into account the circumstances at the specific workplace, and a recycled example that has not been customised for a real site does not satisfy this requirement. Use the examples to understand the methodology and the level of detail, then prepare your own JSA for your own work at your own site, consulting with the workers who will actually perform the task.

Scenario: Isolating a 3-phase switchboard for maintenance in a commercial building. Location: Switchboard SB-02, Ground Floor Plant Room, 120 George Street, Brisbane QLD. The task is performed by one qualified electrician with a second worker as a safety observer during the initial isolation.

Step 1: Notify affected parties of planned isolation. Hazard: miscommunication causing building occupants to continue using equipment that will be isolated, leading to unexpected loss of power and secondary incidents such as people trapped in lifts or critical equipment losing power without backup. Control: written notification issued to the building manager 24 hours prior with a copy to the site supervisor, verbal confirmation on the morning of the work with all affected tenants acknowledged, verification that critical equipment such as lifts and emergency systems has been placed on alternative supply. Risk after controls: low.

Step 2: Identify the correct circuit at the switchboard using the single-line diagram. Hazard: wrong circuit identified, leading to work on an energised circuit because the isolation was applied to a different circuit. Control: verify circuit identity against the single-line diagram, which must be current revision dated within 12 months, physically trace the cable from the switchboard to the load if the diagram is missing or out of date, have a second qualified electrician verify the identification independently. Risk after controls: low.

Step 3: Apply lock-out tag-out device to the circuit breaker. Hazard: contact with live conductors if the breaker is faulty or incorrectly selected, leading to electric shock or arc flash injury. Control: test for dead at the switchboard using a CAT IV voltage tester before applying the lock, wear insulated gloves rated to 1,000 volts AC to AS/NZS 2225, apply a personal padlock and a danger tag with the worker's name, date, and the reason for isolation, ensure no other isolation device can be inadvertently removed by another worker. Risk after controls: low.

Step 4: Verify isolation at the point of work. Hazard: residual electrical charge in the circuit, incorrect isolation not captured by the switchboard test, or back-feed from an alternative supply such as a generator or UPS. Control: test for dead at the work point rather than only at the switchboard using a proved voltage tester, following the prove-test-prove procedure, require two-person verification for 3-phase systems, confirm no back-feed paths are active by tracing any alternative supplies to the circuit. Risk after controls: low.

Step 5: Perform maintenance work on the de-energised equipment. Hazard: re-energisation by another person during the work due to lock removal or administrative error. Control: personal LOTO lock remains applied with the single key held by the worker performing the task, danger tag visible and legible, no other worker is permitted to remove the lock, any change of worker requires the outgoing worker to remove their lock and the incoming worker to apply their own lock before handover. Risk after controls: low.

Step 6: Remove LOTO device and re-energise the circuit. Hazard: arc flash on re-energisation if a fault exists in the maintained equipment, such as a short circuit caused by a loose connection or a tool left in the enclosure. Control: visual inspection of all connections and the enclosure interior before re-energisation, confirm no tools or materials remain, clear the area of personnel who do not need to be present, close the switchboard door before operating the breaker, stand to the side rather than directly in front of the switchboard when re-energising to minimise arc flash exposure. Risk after controls: low.

PPE for the entire task: insulated gloves to AS/NZS 2225, safety glasses to AS/NZS 1337.1 medium impact, arc-rated long-sleeve shirt appropriate to the calculated incident energy, steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3, hard hat to AS/NZS 1801 when working in the plant room, face shield when performing the initial isolation test.

Scenario: Unloading scaffold components from a delivery truck and carrying them to a staging area on a commercial construction site. Location: 45 Pacific Highway, North Sydney NSW. The task is performed by two labourers supervised by the site foreman, and includes an overhead lift using a scaffold hoist.

Step 1: Receive the delivery and inspect materials on the truck. Hazard: unstable load shifting during inspection, resulting in components falling from the truck deck and striking workers or bystanders. Control: driver confirms the load is secure before the tailgate is opened, workers stand to the side when opening the tailgate, nobody stands directly behind the load, the supervisor conducts a visual inspection from a safe distance before any unloading begins. Risk after controls: low.

Step 2: Unload scaffold standards and ledgers from the truck to the ground. Hazard: overexertion during manual handling of scaffold standards weighing up to 22 kg each at 3-metre length, crush injury if a component is dropped on a worker's foot during the lift. Control: two-person lift for any component over 15 kg or longer than 2.4 metres, steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3 worn at all times, use of a truck-mounted crane or forklift for any component over 30 kg, clear the drop zone of other workers before unloading begins. Risk after controls: low.

Step 3: Carry components to the staging area, which is 40 metres from the truck along a sloped access route. Hazard: manual handling fatigue over repetitive trips leading to musculoskeletal injury, slip on wet or uneven ground, collision with other workers or mobile plant moving along the access route. Control: rotate workers every 20 minutes to limit cumulative manual handling exposure, clear and level the access path before the task begins and maintain the path throughout, hi-vis vest to AS/NZS 4602.1 class D or N worn at all times, pre-task briefing with other trades in the shared access area including the mobile plant operators, use of a wheeled trolley for longer carries where feasible. Risk after controls: low.

Step 4: Lift components to the scaffold platform at 4 metres. Hazard: falling objects striking workers below if a component is dropped during the hoist, overexertion if workers attempt manual lifting of components to height without mechanical aid. Control: an exclusion zone established below the hoist point with physical barricading and signage, use of a gin wheel or scaffold hoist for all vertical lifts with no manual throwing of components, hard hat to AS/NZS 1801 mandatory for anyone in the exclusion zone, the hoist load rating verified before each lift, the hoist anchor point inspected before the first lift of the day. Risk after controls: low.

Step 5: Position components on the scaffold platform for assembly. Hazard: components sliding off the platform onto workers or the public below, worker losing balance on the scaffold while handling components. Control: toe-boards installed on all scaffold platforms before materials are placed, components placed flat on the platform and secured against sliding, workers maintain three points of contact when moving on the scaffold, the supervisor verifies that the platform is clear of obstructions before each work cycle. Risk after controls: low.

PPE for the entire task: hi-vis vest to AS/NZS 4602.1, steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3, hard hat to AS/NZS 1801, safety glasses to AS/NZS 1337.1, leather rigger's gloves, long-sleeve shirt and long trousers as per site standard.

Scenario: Replacing a failed 15 kW centrifugal pump motor in a water treatment plant. Location: Pump House 3, Regional Water Treatment Facility, Toowoomba QLD. This example shows a JSA used in an industrial maintenance setting outside construction, demonstrating that JSAs apply across industries.

Step 1: Isolate the pump motor electrically using the site LOTO procedure. Hazard: electrocution from the 415-volt 3-phase supply if isolation is not performed correctly. Control: LOTO procedure as documented in the site permit-to-work system, personal lock and tag applied by each worker involved in the task, test for dead at the motor terminals with a CAT IV voltage tester before any disconnection, isolated circuit verified by a second qualified worker. Risk after controls: low.

Step 2: Drain the system and depressurise the pump. Hazard: pressurised fluid release causing scalding if the system contains hot water, or chemical exposure if treatment chemicals are present in the pump internals. Control: verify the system pressure gauge reads zero before opening any connection, wear chemical-resistant gloves and a face shield during the drain-down operation, drain to a bunded containment area with secondary containment for any spill, a chemical spill response kit available within 5 metres. Risk after controls: low.

Step 3: Disconnect the motor from the pump coupling and the electrical connections. Hazard: stored mechanical energy in the coupling releasing during disconnection, heavy motor weighing 85 kg shifting when disconnected from its mounts. Control: lock the coupling in position before removing the coupling bolts, support the motor weight with a chain block rated to 250 kg before removing the final mounting bolts, verify the chain block is secured to a rated anchor point, keep the area below the motor clear of personnel. Risk after controls: low.

Step 4: Remove the failed motor using a chain block and trolley. Hazard: crush injury during mechanical handling due to a suspended 85 kg load. Control: chain block rated to 250 kg providing a 3:1 safety factor, the area below the suspended load cleared and barricaded, no worker walks or stands under a suspended load, the trolley used for horizontal transport is rated appropriately and inspected before use. Risk after controls: low.

Step 5: Install the new motor and reconnect the coupling. Hazard: incorrect alignment of the coupling causing vibration, premature bearing failure, and potential seal leakage after commissioning. Control: laser alignment tool used to verify shaft alignment within manufacturer tolerance, mounting bolts torqued to the manufacturer specification using a calibrated torque wrench, coupling gap verified with a feeler gauge, alignment checked by a competent person before reconnection. Risk after controls: low.

Step 6: Reconnect the electrical supply and test. Hazard: incorrect phase rotation causing the motor to run backwards, arc flash on energisation if a fault exists in the newly installed connection. Control: verify phase rotation with a phase rotation meter before connecting the supply, stand clear of the motor during initial energisation, run the motor uncoupled for 30 seconds to confirm the correct rotation direction before re-engaging the coupling. Risk after controls: low.

Step 7: Commission the pump and verify operation. Hazard: seal failure causing a fluid leak into the pump house, vibration from residual misalignment affecting other equipment. Control: monitor the pump for 15 minutes during the initial run, visually check for leaks at all connections including the mechanical seal and flange joints, measure vibration levels with a vibration meter and compare against manufacturer tolerance, document the commissioning results in the maintenance record. Risk after controls: low.

PPE for the entire task: safety glasses to AS/NZS 1337.1, steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3, chemical-resistant gloves to AS/NZS 2161.10 for the drain-down step, hard hat to AS/NZS 1801 for the lifting operations, hi-vis vest for visibility in the pump house.

The worked examples above follow a consistent pattern that distinguishes useful JSAs from generic ones. Understanding the pattern makes it easier to apply the same quality to JSAs prepared for different work.

Steps are specific and sequential. Each step describes a single action in the order it actually happens. Not set up and prepare — that is too vague to attach hazards to. Each step should be short enough that a hazard can be identified specifically for that step, and the steps together should tell the story of the task from start to finish without gaps.

Hazards are named precisely. Not injury but laceration from exposed impeller blade during motor removal. Not electrical but electrocution from 415-volt 3-phase supply at motor terminals. The more precise the hazard, the more targeted the control. A hazard description should name the energy source (mechanical, electrical, chemical, thermal, gravitational, pneumatic), the mechanism (contact, release, reaction, collapse, fall), and the body part or system at risk (hands, eyes, respiratory, musculoskeletal).

Controls are actionable and verifiable. Not be careful but apply LOTO lock and tag, verify isolation with a CAT IV voltage tester using the prove-test-prove sequence. A supervisor can check whether the lock and tag are applied. A supervisor cannot check whether a worker was careful. Every control should describe an action that produces observable evidence of compliance.

Risk is assessed before and after controls. This demonstrates that the controls actually reduce the risk. Moving from a high pre-control rating to a low post-control rating shows the controls are meaningful. A rating that remains the same before and after controls suggests either the controls are inadequate or the ratings are inconsistent.

PPE is specified with Australian Standards. Not safety boots but steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3. Not gloves but insulated gloves rated to 1,000 volts AC to AS/NZS 2225. Not a respirator but a P2 particulate respirator to AS/NZS 1716. Standards references make compliance verifiable and demonstrate that the preparer has considered the applicable technical requirements rather than writing from memory.

To understand the difference between a JSA and a SWMS, it helps to see the same work documented in both formats. Take the switchboard isolation from Example 1. As a JSA, the work is broken into six sequential steps with hazards and controls at each step. The JSA follows the task from start to finish — notify, identify, lock out, verify, work, re-energise — and the structure walks the reader through the task in the order it will actually be performed.

As a SWMS extract, the same work would look different. The SWMS would list the applicable HRCW category — work on or near energised electrical installations — and then list the overall hazards for the electrical work scope: shock, arc flash, cable damage, falls from ladder access to the switchboard, manual handling of heavy enclosures. It would list control measures against each hazard — LOTO, RCD protection, test-before-touch, supervision requirements, insulated tools, arc-rated PPE. It would assign responsibilities — who performs the isolation, who supervises, who signs off. It would document the consultation with the electrician who will perform the work and the sign-on from every worker involved.

The SWMS gives the overview of the work and satisfies the Regulation's content requirements for high-risk construction work. The JSA gives the step-by-step detail that helps the worker perform the task safely in practice. For a major task like a switchboard isolation, a competent organisation would typically maintain both documents — the SWMS as the legally required overview and the JSA as the task-level breakdown that supports the pre-start briefing.

This layered approach is common in mining, oil and gas, heavy industrial maintenance, and Tier 1 construction. In smaller operations — sole traders and small crews — a single SWMS is often sufficient and a JSA is not prepared separately. The decision about whether to use both documents or just the SWMS depends on the complexity of the task, the consequence of failure, and the organisation's safety management system maturity. For a detailed comparison with more worked examples, see the dedicated SWMS versus JSA guide.