Plant & Equipment Refuelling SWMS
Plant and equipment refuelling on construction and mining sites — diesel, petrol, and LPG refuelling from bowser and drums. Static bonding, spill containment, fire extinguisher, and no-smoking exclusion.
SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Refuelling mobile plant and stationary equipment on construction and mining sites involves transferring Class 3 flammable liquids (diesel, petrol) and Class 2.1 flammable gases (LPG) from bowsers, service trucks, IBCs, or 205L drums into machinery fuel tanks. The operation creates simultaneous fire, explosion, environmental, and manual handling exposures every time a nozzle is connected. Under WHS Regulation 2025 Chapter 7 (Hazardous Chemicals) and AS 1940:2017, refuelling activities involving flammable liquids in quantities exceeding manifest thresholds, or conducted near ignition sources, are designated high-risk construction work requiring a documented Safe Work Method Statement before commencement. The SWMS must address static bonding, spill containment hierarchy, hot work exclusion zones, and emergency response. PCBUs failing to prepare, communicate, or enforce this SWMS face enforceable undertakings, prohibition notices, and Category 1 prosecution where reckless conduct causes serious injury or environmental harm reportable under state EPA legislation.
Hazards identified
7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Vapour ignition causing flash fire, full-thickness burns, plant destruction, and potential fatality within enclosed bund areas
Flammable atmosphere within explosive limits ignites from ignition source causing deflagration and severe thermal injuries
BLEVE risk, asphyxiation in confined refuelling bay, or jet fire ignition causing fatal burns and structural collapse
Groundwater contamination triggering mandatory EPA notification, remediation costs exceeding six figures, and potential prosecution
Acute lumbar disc injury, crush injury to feet from dropped drums, and long-term musculoskeletal disability claims
Auto-ignition of diesel above 210°C surface temperature causing engine bay fire and operator entrapment in cab
Spark ignition of vapour cloud causing flash fire, regulatory breach of AS 1940 Section 5, and serious burns
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Elimination — Replace diesel-powered ancillary plant with battery-electric equivalents where site duty cycle permits, removing on-site refuelling activity entirely from the work package.
- 2Elimination — Schedule all refuelling at end of shift when engines are cool and personnel numbers in vicinity are at minimum, removing hot-surface and bystander exposure.
- 3Substitution — Replace petrol-powered small plant (compactors, generators) with diesel equivalents where feasible to raise flashpoint from -43°C to above 60°C reducing vapour ignition risk.
- 4Substitution — Use closed-circuit dry-break couplings on service trucks in place of open nozzle bowser fills to eliminate splash-fill static and vapour release.
- 5Engineering — Install bonding cable with crocodile clip from bowser/drum to receiving plant chassis before opening fill cap, verifying continuity per AS 1940:2017 Clause 9.6.
- 6Engineering — Provide bunded refuelling pad with 110% drum capacity containment, interceptor pit, and spill kit containing absorbent booms, pillows, and granular absorbent within 3 metres.
- 7Administrative — Establish and signpost 3-metre no-smoking, no-ignition exclusion zone per AS 1940 Section 5; brief all workers via this SWMS at pre-start with sign-on register.
- 8Administrative — Verify 9kg dry chemical fire extinguisher (30B rating minimum) inspected within 6 months is positioned upwind within 5 metres before any transfer commences.
- 9PPE — Wear anti-static cotton or treated coveralls, chemical-resistant nitrile gloves to AS/NZS 2161.10, safety glasses to AS/NZS 1337.1, and steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3.
- 10PPE — Use full-face shield over safety glasses and elbow-length gauntlets when decanting from 205L drums or connecting LPG forklift cylinders to protect against splash and cold burns.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Clauses 5.6 and 9.6 mandate bonding, exclusion zones, and spill containment for all on-site transfer of Class 3 liquids including mobile refuelling.
Regulation 357 requires risk assessment and control of fire and explosion risks; manifest quantities trigger placarding and emergency planning obligations.
Provides the deemed-compliant control framework for flammable liquid handling including ignition source control and PPE selection during refuelling tasks.
Section 6 governs cylinder exchange procedures and exclusion distances for forklift LPG refuelling, including leak testing before reconnection of plant.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Refuelling occurs within active plant movement corridors where excavators, haul trucks, and service vehicles converge, creating struck-by exposure during transfer.
PCBU must consult workers on this SWMS, retain it for the duration of the high-risk work, and produce it on inspector request; penalties are substantial and indexed annually under the prevailing WHS schedule.
Who this is for
- →Civil construction supervisors managing on-site fuel bowsers
- →Mining service truck operators conducting field refuelling
- →Plant hire companies supplying mobile refuelling units
- →Forklift fleet managers overseeing LPG cylinder exchange
What you receive
- ✓Editable DOCX template — Microsoft Word compatible
- ✓State-specific WHS legislation schedule (NSW/VIC/QLD/SA/WA/TAS/NT/ACT)
- ✓Hazard register with risk ratings + hierarchy-of-control mapping
- ✓Worker sign-on register, pre-start checklist, and incident escalation flow
Worked example
On a regional highway upgrade project, the service truck operator arrives at the laydown area to refuel three idle excavators at shift change. Before commencing, the site supervisor opens this SWMS at the daily pre-start meeting, walks the four-person crew through the seven identified hazards, and confirms each worker signs the consultation register acknowledging the 3-metre exclusion zone. The operator identifies that the southernmost excavator sits within 8 metres of a stormwater inlet — a hazard not perfectly matching the controls as written. Applying the SWMS hierarchy, he elects to relocate refuelling to the bunded pad rather than fill in situ, documenting the variation on the SWMS amendment page. Before transfer, he attaches the bonding cable from bowser to excavator chassis, verifies the 9kg extinguisher is positioned upwind, and confirms the engine has cooled for fifteen minutes since shutdown. Mid-transfer, a delivery driver approaches with a lit cigarette; the operator halts transfer, points to the exclusion signage referenced in the SWMS, and directs the driver away before resuming. After completion, he inspects the nozzle area for drips, closes out the SWMS daily log with no spill recorded, and reports the stormwater proximity to the supervisor for permanent bund relocation. The SWMS functions as a live field document — not a filing cabinet artefact.
Related legislation
- WHS Act 2011 (model)
- WHS Regulation 2025
- AS 1940 — Storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids
Frequently asked questions
Is refuelling on a construction or mining site high risk construction work?
Where it forms part of construction work, yes — refuelling happens inside active plant movement corridors where excavators, haul trucks and service vehicles converge, which is an area with movement of powered mobile plant under section 291(o) of the WHS Regulation, and struck-by exposure during transfer is real. Section 299 then requires the SWMS before work starts, consulted on and produced on inspector request. The hazardous chemicals provisions apply in parallel: manifest quantities of Class 3 flammable liquids trigger placarding and emergency planning obligations independently of the construction rule.
Does this cover LPG cylinder changeover on forklifts?
Yes, as a distinct hazard from liquid fuel transfer. Valve leakage during bottle changeover or fitting connection brings BLEVE risk, jet fire and asphyxiation in a confined refuelling bay. Cylinder exchange procedures, exclusion distances and leak testing before the plant is reconnected follow AS/NZS 1596. PPE escalates for the task as well — a full-face shield over safety glasses and elbow-length gauntlets, because the injury from an LPG connection is a cold burn rather than a splash. Forklift fleet managers running cylinder exchange are one of the intended audiences.
Why is splash-filling treated as a serious hazard?
Because splash-fill generates static in exactly the place where fuel vapour is at its richest. Letting fuel drop into a plastic or unbonded metal container builds charge that discharges at the container mouth and ignites the vapour, causing a flash fire, full-thickness burns and plant destruction — worse inside an enclosed bund. The control is a bonding cable with a crocodile clip from the bowser or drum to the receiving plant chassis, continuity verified before the fill cap is opened, per AS 1940. Closed-circuit dry-break couplings remove splash-fill and vapour release entirely.
Is petrol genuinely more dangerous to handle than diesel?
Substantially, and the document uses that difference as a control. Petrol has a flashpoint far below ambient, so it produces an ignitable vapour at any Australian site temperature, while diesel's flashpoint sits above 60°C. Substituting diesel or battery-electric equivalents for petrol-powered compactors and generators raises the ignition threshold rather than managing it. Petrol vapour is also heavier than air and accumulates in low-lying areas during hot weather refuelling, sitting within its explosive limits until an ignition source arrives, which is why the exclusion zone is signposted and enforced.
How do we handle 205 litre drums without hurting someone?
A full drum weighs roughly 180 kilograms, so it is moved with a drum trolley or lifter — never manhandled — because the listed consequences are acute lumbar disc injury and crush injury to feet from a dropped drum. Decanting is done wearing a full-face shield over safety glasses and elbow-length gauntlets. The transfer happens on a bunded refuelling pad with containment at 110% of drum capacity, an interceptor pit, and a spill kit with absorbent booms, pillows and granular absorbent within three metres. Drum storage sits under the flammable liquids standard.
Document details
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