Plant & Equipment Refuelling SWMS
Plant and equipment refuelling on construction and mining sites — diesel, petrol, and LPG refuelling from bowser and drums. Static bonding, spill containment, fire extinguisher, and no-smoking exclusion.
SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Refuelling mobile plant and stationary equipment on construction and mining sites involves transferring Class 3 flammable liquids (diesel, petrol) and Class 2.1 flammable gases (LPG) from bowsers, service trucks, IBCs, or 205L drums into machinery fuel tanks. The operation creates simultaneous fire, explosion, environmental, and manual handling exposures every time a nozzle is connected. Under WHS Regulation 2025 Chapter 7 (Hazardous Chemicals) and AS 1940:2017, refuelling activities involving flammable liquids in quantities exceeding manifest thresholds, or conducted near ignition sources, are designated high-risk construction work requiring a documented Safe Work Method Statement before commencement. The SWMS must address static bonding, spill containment hierarchy, hot work exclusion zones, and emergency response. PCBUs failing to prepare, communicate, or enforce this SWMS face enforceable undertakings, prohibition notices, and Category 1 prosecution where reckless conduct causes serious injury or environmental harm reportable under state EPA legislation.
Hazards identified
7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Vapour ignition causing flash fire, full-thickness burns, plant destruction, and potential fatality within enclosed bund areas
Flammable atmosphere within explosive limits ignites from ignition source causing deflagration and severe thermal injuries
BLEVE risk, asphyxiation in confined refuelling bay, or jet fire ignition causing fatal burns and structural collapse
Groundwater contamination triggering mandatory EPA notification, remediation costs exceeding six figures, and potential prosecution
Acute lumbar disc injury, crush injury to feet from dropped drums, and long-term musculoskeletal disability claims
Auto-ignition of diesel above 210°C surface temperature causing engine bay fire and operator entrapment in cab
Spark ignition of vapour cloud causing flash fire, regulatory breach of AS 1940 Section 5, and serious burns
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Elimination — Replace diesel-powered ancillary plant with battery-electric equivalents where site duty cycle permits, removing on-site refuelling activity entirely from the work package.
- 2Elimination — Schedule all refuelling at end of shift when engines are cool and personnel numbers in vicinity are at minimum, removing hot-surface and bystander exposure.
- 3Substitution — Replace petrol-powered small plant (compactors, generators) with diesel equivalents where feasible to raise flashpoint from -43°C to above 60°C reducing vapour ignition risk.
- 4Substitution — Use closed-circuit dry-break couplings on service trucks in place of open nozzle bowser fills to eliminate splash-fill static and vapour release.
- 5Engineering — Install bonding cable with crocodile clip from bowser/drum to receiving plant chassis before opening fill cap, verifying continuity per AS 1940:2017 Clause 9.6.
- 6Engineering — Provide bunded refuelling pad with 110% drum capacity containment, interceptor pit, and spill kit containing absorbent booms, pillows, and granular absorbent within 3 metres.
- 7Administrative — Establish and signpost 3-metre no-smoking, no-ignition exclusion zone per AS 1940 Section 5; brief all workers via this SWMS at pre-start with sign-on register.
- 8Administrative — Verify 9kg dry chemical fire extinguisher (30B rating minimum) inspected within 6 months is positioned upwind within 5 metres before any transfer commences.
- 9PPE — Wear anti-static cotton or treated coveralls, chemical-resistant nitrile gloves to AS/NZS 2161.10, safety glasses to AS/NZS 1337.1, and steel-cap boots to AS/NZS 2210.3.
- 10PPE — Use full-face shield over safety glasses and elbow-length gauntlets when decanting from 205L drums or connecting LPG forklift cylinders to protect against splash and cold burns.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Clauses 5.6 and 9.6 mandate bonding, exclusion zones, and spill containment for all on-site transfer of Class 3 liquids including mobile refuelling.
Regulation 357 requires risk assessment and control of fire and explosion risks; manifest quantities trigger placarding and emergency planning obligations.
Provides the deemed-compliant control framework for flammable liquid handling including ignition source control and PPE selection during refuelling tasks.
Section 6 governs cylinder exchange procedures and exclusion distances for forklift LPG refuelling, including leak testing before reconnection of plant.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Site diesel and petrol storage routinely exceeds 1000L manifest threshold during refuelling cycles, placing the activity within placard quantity HRCW classification.
Refuelling occurs within active plant movement corridors where excavators, haul trucks, and service vehicles converge, creating struck-by exposure during transfer.
PCBU must consult workers on this SWMS, retain it for the duration of the high-risk work, and produce it on inspector request; penalties are substantial and indexed annually under the prevailing WHS schedule.
Who this is for
- →Civil construction supervisors managing on-site fuel bowsers
- →Mining service truck operators conducting field refuelling
- →Plant hire companies supplying mobile refuelling units
- →Forklift fleet managers overseeing LPG cylinder exchange
What you receive
- ✓Editable DOCX template — Microsoft Word compatible
- ✓State-specific WHS legislation schedule (NSW/VIC/QLD/SA/WA/TAS/NT/ACT)
- ✓Hazard register with risk ratings + hierarchy-of-control mapping
- ✓Worker sign-on register, pre-start checklist, and incident escalation flow
Worked example
On a regional highway upgrade project, the service truck operator arrives at the laydown area to refuel three idle excavators at shift change. Before commencing, the site supervisor opens this SWMS at the daily pre-start meeting, walks the four-person crew through the seven identified hazards, and confirms each worker signs the consultation register acknowledging the 3-metre exclusion zone. The operator identifies that the southernmost excavator sits within 8 metres of a stormwater inlet — a hazard not perfectly matching the controls as written. Applying the SWMS hierarchy, he elects to relocate refuelling to the bunded pad rather than fill in situ, documenting the variation on the SWMS amendment page. Before transfer, he attaches the bonding cable from bowser to excavator chassis, verifies the 9kg extinguisher is positioned upwind, and confirms the engine has cooled for fifteen minutes since shutdown. Mid-transfer, a delivery driver approaches with a lit cigarette; the operator halts transfer, points to the exclusion signage referenced in the SWMS, and directs the driver away before resuming. After completion, he inspects the nozzle area for drips, closes out the SWMS daily log with no spill recorded, and reports the stormwater proximity to the supervisor for permanent bund relocation. The SWMS functions as a live field document — not a filing cabinet artefact.
Related legislation
- WHS Act 2011 (model)
- WHS Regulation 2025
- AS 1940 — Storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids