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Plant Recommissioning / Restart SWMS

SWMS template for plant recommissioning / restart. Covers Permit close-out, LOTO removal, dry/wet runs.. 8-state AU coverage, CIH-reviewed editable DOCX, available as an instant download.

⚖️WHS Regulation 2025 & Codes of Practice — legally binding from 1 July 2026 (s26A)
👷Reviewed by certified occupational health and safety professionals
🗺️State-specific variants for all 8 Australian jurisdictions
$99 AUD✓ Instant Download Available

SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.

Plant recommissioning and restart covers the controlled reintroduction of energy and process flows into fixed and mobile plant following maintenance, shutdown, modification or breakdown. The work spans permit-to-work close-out, lockout/tagout (LOTO) removal, function checks, dry runs without product, and progressive wet runs with live media — across electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, thermal and stored-energy systems. Under WHS Regulation 2011 r291 and the harmonised 2025 amendments, restart of plant where multiple energy sources are reintroduced or where stored energy may be released is classified as High Risk Construction Work (HRCW), making a written Safe Work Method Statement mandatory before work commences. The risk profile is dominated by latent energy, mistimed isolations, and incomplete handovers between maintenance and operations crews. A documented SWMS aligns the recommissioning sequence with AS/NZS 4836, AS/NZS 3000 and the Managing Risks of Plant in the Workplace Code of Practice, ensuring every isolation point, witness check and sign-on is verified before energisation.

Hazards identified

7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.

Premature LOTO removal while personnel remain in the danger zone of the plantHIGH

Crush, entanglement or electrocution fatality; PCBU breach of WHS Act s19 primary duty and r291 HRCW controls

Stored energy release from accumulators, capacitors, springs, elevated loads or pressurised lines on re-energisationHIGH

High-velocity fluid injection, projectile impact, arc flash burns, traumatic limb amputation or fatality of restart crew

Cross-connected or back-fed circuits energising isolated equipment from a secondary source not identified on the isolation registerHIGH

Unexpected start-up, electric shock, arc flash injury and breach of AS/NZS 4836 verification-of-isolation requirements

Incomplete permit close-out leaving temporary jumpers, bypassed interlocks or defeated guards in placeHIGH

Safety system fails on demand causing entanglement, runaway plant condition or process safety event with multi-casualty potential

Hot, cold or chemical media discharge from process lines during wet-run pressurisation through leaking flanges or open ventsMEDIUM

Thermal scalds, chemical burns, respiratory exposure and notifiable incident under WHS Act s38 dangerous incident provisions

Communication breakdown between control room operator, field witness and isolation officer during sequenced restart stepsMEDIUM

Misaligned valves, wrong-equipment start, mechanical damage, worker injury and SWMS non-compliance under r299 stop-work duty

Noise, vibration and rotating-equipment hazard during initial dry-run with newly aligned couplings and bearingsLOW

Hearing damage above 85 dB(A) LAeq,8h, coupling burst, projectile fragments and breach of AS/NZS 1269 noise exposure standard

Control measures

Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.

  1. 1Elimination — Where reasonably practicable, complete all maintenance tasks before any restart sequence so no personnel remain within the plant envelope when energy is reintroduced.
  2. 2Elimination — Remove redundant temporary test leads, jumpers and bypass straps from control circuits before LOTO removal so latent defeats cannot energise on restart.
  3. 3Substitution — Replace manual valve cracking for pressurisation with motor-operated valve ramping controlled from the DCS, eliminating worker presence at the pressure boundary during wet run.
  4. 4Engineering — Apply staged energisation through interlocked field isolators, soft-starters and pressure ramp profiles per AS/NZS 3000 cl 2.3 verification, with witness of zero-energy state before each step.
  5. 5Engineering — Install fixed machine guarding, vibration trip protection and emergency stop functional test prior to first rotation, verified against AS 4024.1 functional safety requirements.
  6. 6Administrative — Execute restart under a formal Permit-to-Work close-out checklist with signed isolation register reconciliation, witnessed LOTO removal and documented sequence sign-off per Managing Risks of Plant CoP.
  7. 7Administrative — Conduct pre-start SWMS briefing with all restart crew, control room and field operators, recording attendance, hazard walk and stop-work authority on the SWMS sign-on register.
  8. 8Administrative — Establish exclusion zones with hard barriers and signage during dry and wet runs; only the nominated restart crew permitted inside the zone per r291 HRCW controls.
  9. 9PPE — Issue arc-rated clothing to category 2 minimum, insulated gloves tested per AS/NZS 2225, safety glasses, hearing protection class 5 and steel-capped boots for all field restart activities.
  10. 10PPE — Provide chemical splash suits, full face shields and respiratory protection rated to AS/NZS 1716 where wet-run media includes hydrocarbons, acids, caustics or hot condensate above 60°C.

Applicable Codes of Practice

WHS Regulation 2011 r291 — High Risk Construction Work and SWMS requirements⚖ Legally binding · 1 Jul 2026

Plant restart involving reintroduction of multiple energy sources is HRCW under r291(j) and (k), mandating a written SWMS before work commences.

Managing Risks of Plant in the Workplace — Code of Practice (Safe Work Australia 2024)⚖ Legally binding · 1 Jul 2026

Sets the duty to verify isolation, control stored energy and document restart procedures during commissioning and recommissioning of fixed and mobile plant.

AS/NZS 4836:2023 — Safe working on or near low-voltage and extra-low-voltage electrical installations and equipment

Defines the verification-of-isolation, test-before-touch and proving-unit requirements applied at every LOTO removal step during electrical restart.

AS 4024.1:2019 — Safety of machinery, functional safety of control systems

Governs functional testing of interlocks, e-stops and guard monitoring circuits which must be proven before plant is released to operations.

High-Risk Construction Work triggered

14
Work on or near energised electrical installations or services

LOTO removal and dry-run electrical verification places workers adjacent to energised switchboards, motor circuits and control systems during the reintroduction sequence.

18
Work involving the disturbance or reintroduction of stored energy in plant

Restart inherently reintroduces hydraulic, pneumatic, thermal, gravitational and electrical energy across multiple systems with high-consequence failure modes if mis-sequenced.

Legal consequence

PCBU must prepare, consult workers on and retain the SWMS for the duration of the HRCW; penalties for non-compliance are substantial and indexed, with the current maximum following the prevailing WHS schedule.

Who this is for

  • Commissioning engineers on industrial and infrastructure projects
  • Maintenance supervisors managing planned shutdown restarts
  • Principal contractors handing plant back to operations
  • Electrical and mechanical fitters performing LOTO removal

What you receive

  • Editable DOCX template — Microsoft Word compatible
  • State-specific WHS legislation schedule (NSW/VIC/QLD/SA/WA/TAS/NT/ACT)
  • Hazard register with risk ratings + hierarchy-of-control mapping
  • Worker sign-on register, pre-start checklist, and incident escalation flow

Worked example

On a regional water treatment upgrade, the commissioning supervisor convenes a pre-start brief at 0630 in the site office before recommissioning a 315 kW raw-water pump set following bearing replacement and VSD firmware update. The Plant Recommissioning / Restart SWMS is projected on the screen and walked through line by line with the electrical fitter, mechanical fitter, control room operator and the appointed isolation officer. Working through the hazard register, the crew flag that the discharge non-return valve was disassembled during shutdown — a stored-energy and back-flow risk not present in the standard sequence. The team selects the engineering control of staged DCS-ramped pressurisation and adds an exclusion zone extending two metres beyond the flange, marking it on the site plan attached to the SWMS. Each worker signs the sign-on register acknowledging stop-work authority. During the dry run at 0915, the fitter observes coupling vibration exceeding the trip setpoint flagged in the SWMS control measure for AS 4024.1 functional testing. He invokes stop-work, the supervisor re-isolates per the LOTO removal reversal procedure documented in the SWMS, and the alignment is re-shimmed. The SWMS is amended in the field, re-signed by all parties, and the wet run proceeds only after the amended document is re-briefed — demonstrating the SWMS functioning as a live control document rather than a filed record.

Related legislation

  • WHS Act 2011 (model)
  • WHS Regulation 2025
  • Construction Work CoP
What's in this SWMS

Document details

Regulation
WHS Regulation 2011 r291 — High Risk Construction Work; applicable state WHS Regulations and Codes of Practice.
HRCW Category
Energy reintroduction, multi-system, high-consequence
Hazards Identified
6 hazards with controls
Format
Editable DOCX (Microsoft Word)
Author
Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH)
Delivery
Instant download after payment