Fire Hydrant & Hose Reel Inspection SWMS

Routine inspection and testing of fire hydrant systems, booster assemblies, landing valves and hose reels in commercial and high-rise buildings is safety-critical work governed by AS 1851-2012 Routine Service of Fire Protection Systems and Equipment. The activity involves pressurising hydrant mains to working pressure, operating isolation and landing valves, conducting flow and pressure verification at the most hydraulically disadvantaged outlet, and verifying booster pit integrity — frequently in confined pits, on rooftops, and within risers carrying live charged mains. Work triggers WHS Regulation 2025 section 291 High Risk Construction Work because booster pits meet the confined space definition under AS 2865 and because anti-freeze additives used in exposed booster lines are classified hazardous chemicals. A documented Safe Work Method Statement is mandatory before work commences, must be developed in consultation with workers under WHS Reg 2025 s47-49, and must be available on site for the duration of the task and retained for two years (or the duration of any notifiable incident investigation).

Hazards identified

7 hazards covered, sorted by priority.

Control measures

Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.

1. 1Elimination — Where feasible, decommission redundant landing valves and remove from service rather than recommissioning, eliminating ongoing stored-energy exposure during future test cycles.
2. 2Elimination — Drain and depressurise the riser section under test through the lowest drain valve before any disassembly, eliminating stored hydraulic energy at the work face.
3. 3Substitution — Substitute glycol anti-freeze with propylene glycol food-grade alternative or trace-heated booster lines, removing toxic ethylene glycol from the workstream entirely.
4. 4Engineering — Install permanent gas-detection sensors and forced mechanical ventilation in booster pits classified as confined spaces under AS 2865, with continuous atmospheric monitoring during entry.
5. 5Engineering — Use a calibrated pitot-tube flow tester with diffuser bag and outlet anchoring to control reaction forces during flow verification at the disadvantaged outlet per AS 1851 Section 2.
6. 6Administrative — Issue a confined space entry permit and hot work permit where required, with stand-by attendant, rescue plan and communications established before pit entry per AS 2865.
7. 7Administrative — Notify building fire indicator panel monitoring service and building manager before isolating any zone; place out-of-service tags per AS 1851 Section 1.17 and reinstate within shift.
8. 8Administrative — Conduct documented pre-start briefing using this SWMS, confirm SDS for glycol products is on site, and verify all workers hold current confined space and CPR competencies.
9. 9PPE — Wear AS/NZS 1337 wide-vision goggles, AS/NZS 2161 chemical-resistant nitrile gloves, AS/NZS 1801 hard hat with chinstrap, and AS/NZS 2210 safety footwear for all valve work.
10. 10PPE — Use AS/NZS 1891 full-body harness with twin lanyards for rooftop hydrant testing, and supplied-air respirator per AS/NZS 1715 where pit atmospheric testing indicates oxygen below 19.5%.

Applicable Codes of Practice

High-Risk Construction Work triggered

Worked example

On a 14-storey commercial tower undergoing scheduled annual AS 1851 hydrant testing, the lead fire technician opens the pre-start briefing at the ground-floor booster cabinet at 0700. Using this SWMS as the briefing document, she walks the two-person crew through each of the seven hazards, focusing the team on confined space entry to the below-grade booster pit and stored hydraulic energy at the rooftop landing valve. The crew confirms the building manager has been notified, the FIP monitoring service is on test mode, and out-of-service tags are placed at the FIP. Atmospheric testing of the booster pit returns 20.4% oxygen, 0 ppm CO and 0% LEL — the entry permit is signed, a stand-by attendant is posted at the pit lip with radio comms, and the tripod retrieval system is rigged. Each worker signs the SWMS sign-on register acknowledging the controls. Mid-task, the technician discovers the rooftop riser drain is seized, meaning the disadvantaged landing valve cannot be depressurised through the documented method. Work stops. She documents the change on the SWMS amendment page, briefs the offsider on the substitute control — backing pressure off via the booster drain and venting through a lower hydrant — re-signs the amended document, and proceeds. The amended SWMS is filed with the AS 1851 baseline data report at job close.

Related legislation

• WHS Act 2011 (model)
• WHS Regulation 2025
• AS 2865 — Confined spaces

Frequently asked questions