Machine Wiring & VSD Commissioning SWMS
SWMS variants reference your state’s WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
Machine wiring and variable speed drive commissioning is high risk construction work in New South Wales because the commissioning phase cannot be done dead. Wiring can be. Proving direction of rotation, tuning a drive to its motor, verifying a safety circuit and running the machine under load cannot — and section 291 of the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 (NSW) captures that under the energised electrical category, with a safe work method statement required under section 299. SafeWork NSW is the regulator. AS/NZS 3000 governs the installation and AS 4024 governs the machine's safety of machinery requirements.
A variable speed drive breaks the trade's oldest rule of thumb: that isolation makes equipment safe to touch. It does not, and the reason is the DC bus. The drive's capacitors hold a lethal charge for minutes after the supply is opened, and the display that would tell you the bus is still live is itself powered from that bus — so **the darkest, deadest-looking drive is the least reliable indication you will ever be offered**. The manufacturer's discharge time is waited out, and then the bus is proved at the terminals with an instrument. Every time.
The drive's second trap is that it starts things. Auto-restart on power return is a factory default on many drives, and a permanent magnet motor generates voltage at its own terminals whenever its shaft turns — which means restraining a conveyor or a fan against windmilling is an electrical control, not a mechanical convenience. This SWMS is authored around those mechanisms: DC bus discharge and proving, isolation that includes the start path and the shaft, and safety-circuit verification that is proved by test rather than assumed from a parameter list.
Hazards identified
14 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Fatality — electrocution from the DC bus after the supply is isolated and the drive appears dead
Fatality — a worker in the machine when the drive auto-restarts on power return
Fatality or catastrophic burns — arc flash causes burn and blast injury together
Fatality — electrocution during commissioning, parameter setting or autotune at an open panel
Fatality — electrocution from a PM motor's terminals with the drive isolated and the shaft turning
Fatality or amputation — entanglement in the driven machine during a running commissioning test
Fatality or crush injury — stored mechanical, hydraulic or pneumatic energy released during work
Fatality — a fall from height installing tray, wiring and drive panels above floor level
Fatality or amputation — a defeated or unverified safety circuit fails to stop the machine on demand
Serious burns from the drive heatsink, braking resistor or motor casing after running
Fire in the drive panel spreading to the machine and the building
Permanent noise-induced hearing loss from the machine, carrier frequency and running tests
Cuts, abrasions and eye injury from panel building, gland plate cutting and cable stripping
Musculoskeletal injury from handling drives, panels, motors and cable drums in restricted plant space
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Isolate the supply, then wait the manufacturer's full DC bus discharge time and **prove the bus dead at the terminals with an instrument** — never rely on a dark display, which is powered from the very bus it would warn you about.
- 2Isolate and lock out the supply AND every start path — the run command, the remote and PLC start, and any auto-restart parameter — because killing the run command is not isolation of a machine designed to restart, and verify rotation is impossible physically rather than from a panel.
- 3Obtain an arc flash risk assessment establishing incident energy and approach boundaries at the actual switchboard and drive panel, verify upstream protection, and close the panel for any test that can be done closed.
- 4Complete all wiring and pre-energisation verification dead under Part 4.7 Div 4 ss.154 & 157; identify the commissioning tasks that genuinely require energisation in advance and carry them out under a documented method with a competent person and a second person present who can isolate and perform rescue.
- 5Restrain the shaft of any permanent magnet motor before work — a PM motor generates voltage at its own terminals whenever the shaft turns, so shaft restraint is an electrical control, not a mechanical convenience.
- 6Fit and secure all guards for every running test, with an emergency stop reachable from the working position and proved before the first run, and exclude persons from the machine's motion envelope during any run.
- 7Isolate and dissipate every stored energy source in the driven machine — hydraulic accumulators, pneumatic receivers, suspended masses, springs and flywheels — and block or restrain what cannot be dissipated.
- 8Provide a designed working platform or EWP for tray, wiring and panel installation above floor level, with rated anchorage and a rescue plan before any harness use.
- 9Prove every safety function by test at the machine — a safety circuit is verified by demonstrating it stops the machine on demand, never by reading a parameter list or a drawing — and reverse and re-verify any temporary bypass before handover.
- 10Treat the heatsink, braking resistor and motor casing as hot for a defined period after any run rather than testing by touch, and guard or barrier hot surfaces in the work area.
- 11Verify termination torque to specification, ventilation clearances and filter condition before energisation, and thermographically survey the panel under load at commissioning.
- 12Assess noise exposure against the exposure standard by a competent person, limit and rotate time at running machines, and select hearing protection to the measured level to AS/NZS 1270.
- 13Deburr and grommet gland plates and cut edges, use the correct stripping tools, and wear eye protection and cut-resistant gloves for panel building and cable preparation.
- 14Use mechanical aids and two-person handling for drives, panels, motors and cable drums, stage material at the point of use, and rotate tasks in restricted plant space.
Applicable Codes of Practice
The installation, protection and verification requirements for the machine's supply, the drive circuit and the motor circuit.
The safety functions, categories and verification requirements for the driven machine's guarding and safety circuits — the standard the crew proves the machine against, not the one it reads.
The benchmark for isolation, testing for dead and the conduct of low-voltage work — including the proving discipline the DC bus demands.
The drive's own safety requirements, including the discharge behaviour of the DC link that defines this product's central hazard.
The benchmark for isolation, testing for dead, arc flash risk and the conduct of energised work where it cannot be avoided.
The benchmark for guarding, isolation and lock-out including automatic and remote initiation, and stored energy in the driven machine.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Machine wiring, cable tray and drive panels are installed above floor level on plant, gantries and structures, and the work is two-handed at height throughout the installation phase.
Commissioning necessarily energises. Direction proving, autotune, safety-circuit verification and load running cannot be done dead — and the drive adds two mechanisms the trade does not meet elsewhere: a DC bus that stays lethal after isolation, and a PM motor that generates whenever its shaft turns.
Carrying out high risk construction work without a compliant SWMS is an offence under the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 (NSW). An electrocution from a DC bus after isolation is the incident SafeWork NSW investigates hardest on this class of work, because it is entirely foreseeable and entirely documented by the drive manufacturer. A SWMS that records isolation but not discharge time and proving is evidence the PCBU did not understand the equipment it was commissioning.
Who this is for
- →Electrical contractors commissioning VSD-driven plant on construction and fit-out projects
- →Machine builders and integrators wiring and commissioning production equipment on site
- →PCBUs installing conveyors, pumps, fans and process machinery driven by variable speed drives
- →Principal contractors requiring a compliant SWMS from an electrical subcontractor before drive commissioning
- →Maintenance contractors replacing or re-commissioning drives on existing plant
What you receive
- ✓A complete 14-hazard SWMS authored for NSW, citing the WHS Regulation 2025 (NSW), section 291 and section 299
- ✓Risk ratings across initial and residual, with the controls that bridge them written in full
- ✓Controls structured across all five levels of the hierarchy — elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative, PPE
- ✓The DC bus discharge and proving discipline written as a control, not a footnote
- ✓Auto-restart and PM motor start-path isolation authored as electrical controls
- ✓A PPE schedule mapped task by task to the applicable Australian Standard
- ✓An emergency response section written for electrical contact, arc flash and unexpected machine start
- ✓A worker sign-on register and an HRCW checklist left blank for the PCBU to complete
- ✓Editable Microsoft Word format, ready to add project and PCBU detail
Worked example
An electrician is called back to a conveyor drive that tripped overnight. He opens the isolator, waits what feels like long enough, and opens the drive's terminal cover to check the motor terminations. The drive's display is dark — it has been dark since he pulled the isolator, which is exactly what he expected. He touches a DC bus terminal and receives a fatal shock. The investigation finds the drive was a 90 kW unit with a bus discharge time of five minutes stated on a label inside the door and on page one of the manual. Ninety seconds elapsed between isolation and contact. The display was dark not because the bus was discharged but because the display is powered from the bus through a low-current supply that drops out long before the bus reaches a safe voltage — the darkness was the first symptom of a bus that still held lethal energy, not evidence that it did not. The contractor's SWMS said: isolate, lock out, test for dead. It did not say how long to wait, and it did not say to prove the bus at the terminals. Both facts were available in the manufacturer's documentation on the day. SafeWork NSW's position was that the SWMS did not address the hazard the equipment actually presented, and the PCBU could not show that the worker had been given the information the drive's own manual provided. This SWMS names the mechanism, requires the manufacturer's discharge time to be waited out, and requires the bus proved dead at the terminals before contact.
Related legislation
- Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) — primary duty of care (s19), consultation (s47), notifiable incidents (ss35–38), industrial manslaughter (s26A)
- Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 (NSW) — HRCW (s291), SWMS content and requirement (s299), SWMS review (s302)
- Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 (NSW) — Part 4.7 Division 4, sections 154 and 157 — prohibition on energised electrical work
- Work Health and Safety Regulation 2025 (NSW) — Chapter 5 (plant) — guarding, isolation and stored energy in the driven machine
- Electricity Supply Act 1995 (NSW) and the licensing framework administered by NSW Fair Trading — electrical work licensing