Dust Extraction (LEV) Maintenance SWMS
Local exhaust ventilation (LEV) maintenance — filter change, ductwork inspection, fan service, bag/cartridge replacement, annual capture-velocity testing per AS/NZS 2243.8. Includes LOTO, combustible-dust controls, and P2 RPE during filter change.
SWMS variants reference your state's WHS legislation. Instant download after payment.
This SWMS covers the full scope of local exhaust ventilation (LEV) and dust-extraction-system maintenance on Australian industrial and manufacturing sites — cartridge and bag filter change, ductwork inspection and internal cleaning, fan motor service and impeller balancing, rotary-valve and screw-conveyor maintenance on dust-discharge equipment, explosion-vent panel inspection, hopper unblocking, annual capture-velocity and face-velocity testing to AS/NZS 2243.8, and competent-person recertification of extraction systems following modification. It is written for LEV service technicians, facility maintenance teams, specialist ventilation contractors, stonemasons maintaining bench extraction, joinery-shop maintenance crews, metal-fabrication shops servicing welding-fume extractors, and bakery and food-manufacturing teams maintaining combustible-dust collectors. Every activity in this document has been authored against the 2023 Safe Work Australia Code of Practice "Managing the risks of plant in the workplace," the 2024 Silica Code of Practice, the 2024 Welding Processes Code of Practice, and the AS/NZS 60079.10.2 hazardous-area classification framework for combustible dust.
LEV maintenance is not automatically high-risk construction work, but the activities it requires routinely trigger multiple HRCW categories under Schedule 1 of the WHS Regulation 2025. Category 11 — work in or near a confined space — is triggered when a worker must enter a dust-collector vessel, a horizontal duct run, a hopper, or a baghouse compartment, all of which meet the AS 2865-2009 confined-space definition once opened for maintenance. Category 3 — work at a height greater than 2 metres — is triggered when rooftop collector access, elevated duct inspection, or platform-mounted fan service requires ladders, EWPs, or walkways above 2 metres. Additional regulatory pressure comes from the exposure standards for the contaminants the LEV was built to capture: the respirable crystalline silica WEL is 0.05 mg/m³, stepping down to 0.025 mg/m³ from 1 December 2026; the hardwood-dust WEL is 1 mg/m³; welding fume was reclassified as a Group 1 carcinogen by Safe Work Australia in December 2024 and exposure must be reduced so far as is reasonably practicable. A poorly maintained LEV is the principal failure mode that allows these exposures to exceed the WEL and expose the PCBU to prosecution, workers' compensation liability, and — where a fatality results — industrial-manslaughter charges under the amendments now in force in every state.
Hazards identified
10 hazards covered, sorted by priority.
Inhalation of concentrated silica, hardwood dust, welding fume, flour, or other captured contaminants at exposures that routinely exceed 10 times the task-based exposure during filter-bag and cartridge change without bag-in/bag-out containment.
Oxygen deficiency from residual dust displacement, entrapment during sudden material shift, and toxic-atmosphere exposure from decomposed organic dust; a notifiable confined-space fatality risk under AS 2865-2009.
Fatal or permanent injury from falls exceeding 2 metres during access to rooftop baghouses, elevated cartridge units, mezzanine-mounted fans, and platform-mounted cyclones.
Electrocution from unproven isolation of a fan motor, arc flash at the motor-control-centre starter, and residual DC-bus energy in variable-frequency drives that have not been allowed to discharge.
Catastrophic deflagration and secondary dust explosion when hot work, electrostatic discharge, or mechanical sparks ignite flour, sugar, metal, wood, or plastic dust in the accumulated layer on a collector or the cloud inside the housing; the 2008 Imperial Sugar disaster framework applies under AS/NZS 60079.10.2.
Entanglement and crush injury from fan impellers that continue rotating for ten minutes or more after electrical isolation; a leading cause of LEV-maintenance lacerations and degloving.
Severe laceration and amputation when hands or body are caught in unguarded rotary discharge valves under the collector hopper during unblocking, cleaning, or filter work.
Musculoskeletal injury from lifting 20-40 kg filter bags from overhead positions, shifting 200 L collector drums, and repeated awkward-posture tasks during cartridge-bank filter change.
Noise-induced hearing loss during capture-velocity testing with the fan running (85-95 dB(A) at the unit) and during reverse-pulse cartridge cleaning (up to 105 dB(A) at the discharge valve).
Toxic or corrosive exposure from caked process residues inside ductwork (e.g. cyanide-containing plating mist, chromate welding fume, acid-mist from pickling lines) and from cleaning solvents used during decontamination.
Control measures
Hierarchy-of-controls order: elimination → substitution → isolation → engineering → administrative → PPE.
- 1Eliminate vessel entry where design permits. Specify cartridge systems that allow external filter change through bag-in/bag-out ports so that no worker is required to enter the collector housing for routine service. Replace baghouses with cartridge units at end-of-life where the dust permits.
- 2Apply full LOTO on the fan motor circuit and the VFD per the separate lockout/tagout procedure before commencing any LEV maintenance work. Allow the VFD DC bus to discharge per the manufacturer's specified wait time, typically 5-15 minutes, and verify with a calibrated meter before opening enclosures.
- 3Verify complete fan spin-down before opening any impeller housing or ductwork. Large industrial fans continue rotating for 10 minutes or more after electrical isolation; use an observation port, tachometer, or visual inspection to confirm zero rotation. Never open a housing on a fan that has not been verified stopped.
- 4Combustible-dust risk assessment per AS/NZS 60079.10.2 for any system handling flour, sugar, wood, metal (aluminium, magnesium, iron), plastic, or other Class II combustible dust. Classify the internal volume as a hazardous area, select intrinsically-safe tools and torches, and prohibit hot work and smoking within the ignition-protection zone for the duration of any maintenance that opens the containment.
- 5Inspect combustible-dust systems for explosion-protection integrity before maintenance — isolation valves, rotary air-locks, venting panels, and suppression-system readiness. Confirm the explosion-isolation valves close correctly and the venting panels are unobstructed and within their certification date.
- 6HEPA-vacuum pre-cleaning of filter cavities, collector hoppers, and accessible duct interiors before any entry or filter change. Pre-cleaning reduces residual dust mass and cuts inhalation exposure during the change-out itself. Use an H-class vacuum minimum; M-class is inadequate for silica.
- 7Bag-in/bag-out filter change for silica, asbestos, chromate, and high-toxicity dust systems. The new filter is sealed into the housing through a PVC bag sleeve that is folded, taped, and cut after the old filter is inside a discharge bag; no airborne release occurs during change-out. Spent bags are sealed and disposed of through the licensed waste stream.
- 8Negative-pressure containment or portable enclosure around the filter-change position for silica and asbestos systems, maintained by a HEPA-filtered negative-air unit with documented air-change rate. Decontamination shower and change room at the exit if filter work is prolonged or repeated.
- 9Confined-space permit-to-work per AS 2865-2009 where vessel or duct entry is unavoidable. Atmospheric test for oxygen, LEL, and the relevant contaminant before entry and continuously during entry; standby person at the entry portal; rescue plan with appropriate retrieval equipment; two-way communication; written permit displayed at the entry.
- 10Annual LEV capture-velocity, face-velocity, and static-pressure test per AS/NZS 2243.8 by a competent person. The test verifies that each hood, booth, or bench captures at the design velocity, that downstream duct transport velocity is adequate to avoid settlement, and that the filter pressure drop is within the operating envelope. Results documented and retained for the life of the equipment.
- 11Fall protection for rooftop and elevated access: edge protection or existing permanent walkways where available; travel-restraint harness and anchor where edge protection is not reasonably practicable; fall-arrest harness and twin lanyard to AS/NZS 1891.1 only as a last resort. Fragile roof elements identified and demarcated before access.
- 12Combustible-dust housekeeping per the Housekeeping Code under NFPA 654 and AS/NZS 60079.10.2 equivalents: no compressed-air cleaning of accumulated dust (use HEPA vacuum only); maintain accumulated dust layer below 3 mm on all horizontal surfaces; weekly housekeeping audit with documented sign-off.
- 13Respiratory protection selection based on the captured contaminant: P2 half-face for general nuisance-dust work; P3 half-face or full-face cartridge for silica, hardwood, and welding-fume systems; PAPR or supplied-air for asbestos systems, chromate systems, and confined-space entry with high residual dust. All tight-fitting respirators quantitatively fit tested per AS/NZS 1715:2009.
- 14PPE baseline: Type 5/6 disposable coveralls for dust-laden work; nitrile chemical gloves over leather task gloves; safety glasses and sealed goggles where dust loading is high; hearing protection Class 4 or 5 during operating fan tests and pulse-clean cycles; intrinsically-safe torches in combustible-dust zones; mechanical-handling aids for filter-bag manipulation.
- 15Psychosocial controls per WHS Regulation 2025 r55A-55D: realistic maintenance windows that allow full isolation, spin-down, and pre-cleaning time; no production pressure to shortcut confined-space permits or bypass LOTO; two-worker standard for all confined-space and combustible-dust work; clear escalation pathway when conditions deviate from the SWMS.
- 16Daily pre-start toolbox talk covering the day's maintenance scope, confirmed isolation and lockout status, atmospheric-test results for any confined-space activity, combustible-dust classification, RPE fit confirmation, and fall-protection arrangements. Record attendance on the SWMS worker sign-on register and the permit-to-work if applicable.
Applicable Codes of Practice
Principal binding guidance covering maintenance, inspection, isolation, and competent-person duties for LEV and dust-extraction plant under Part 4.5 of the WHS Regulation.
Applies where the LEV serves welding-fume extractors; governs maintenance, testing, and RPE for welding-fume control following the December 2024 Group 1 carcinogen reclassification.
Applies where the LEV serves an abrasive-blasting booth; governs maintenance and recertification of blasting-cabinet ventilation and filtration.
Applies because residual captured contaminants are hazardous chemicals with Workplace Exposure Limits; governs air monitoring, RPE, and health monitoring during and after LEV maintenance.
Binding requirements for permit-to-work, atmospheric testing, standby person, and rescue arrangements for any vessel, duct, or hopper entry during LEV maintenance.
Applies where the LEV serves silica-generating plant; requires documented maintenance schedule, annual testing, and contaminant-specific change-out procedures.
Technical standard for hazardous-area classification of combustible-dust systems; underpins ignition-protection, explosion-venting, and hot-work controls during maintenance.
High-Risk Construction Work triggered
Dust-collector vessels, horizontal duct runs, hoppers, and baghouse compartments meet the AS 2865-2009 definition of a confined space once opened for maintenance; entry for cleaning, filter change, or internal inspection is HRCW.
Rooftop-mounted baghouses, elevated cartridge banks, mezzanine fans, and platform-mounted cyclones require access above 2 metres; ladder, EWP, and platform access to those assets during maintenance triggers the falls HRCW category.
Because this work triggers multiple HRCW categories, Section 299 of the WHS Regulation 2025 (NSW) requires the SWMS to be prepared before work commences, kept available on site for inspection, reviewed and updated if the work changes, and provided to the Principal Contractor on request where LEV maintenance forms part of a construction project. Failure by a PCBU to prepare or keep a current SWMS for HRCW is an offence under Section 300; maximum penalty for a body corporate is $36,000 per offence, and for an individual $7,200. Separately, an LEV failure that causes a worker to be overexposed to silica, welding fume, or hardwood dust creates a direct breach of the Chapter 7 hazardous-chemicals duty and a potential workers' compensation pathway under the dust-diseases legislation. A combustible-dust deflagration that causes a fatality is subject to industrial-manslaughter prosecution under the 2024 amendments now in force in every state.
Who this is for
- →LEV service technicians and specialist ventilation contractors performing scheduled maintenance, filter change, and annual testing on fixed extraction systems.
- →Facility maintenance teams responsible for in-house servicing of dust collectors, bag-houses, cartridge banks, and downdraft benches.
- →Stonemasons, joinery-shop operators, and metal fabricators maintaining workshop-scale extraction systems as part of a Part 4.5 plant duty.
- →Bakery, food-manufacturing, and pharmaceutical maintenance teams servicing combustible-dust and high-toxicity extraction systems.
- →Competent persons conducting annual AS/NZS 2243.8 capture-velocity and face-velocity tests for statutory LEV recertification.
What you receive
- ✓Editable Microsoft Word (.docx) document delivered within 24 hours of payment
- ✓Title page with PCBU name, ABN, site address, plant identifier, competent person, and revision-date fields.
- ✓Signed approval block for PCBU, plant owner, and nominated LEV maintenance supervisor.
- ✓Hazard register with the 10 hazards above, each with consequence, inherent risk, controls, and residual risk scored on a 5x5 likelihood-consequence matrix.
- ✓LEV register template — one row per system with asset number, served process, filtration type, combustible-dust classification, and annual test due date.
- ✓Annual AS/NZS 2243.8 capture-velocity and face-velocity test report template for competent-person use.
- ✓Confined-space permit-to-work template aligned to AS 2865-2009 for vessel and duct entry.
- ✓Worker sign-on register for daily acknowledgement with space for permit and competency references.
- ✓Legislation schedule pre-populated for NSW with variance table for VIC, QLD, SA, WA, TAS, NT, ACT including combustible-dust hazardous-area classifications.
- ✓Emergency contacts, incident-reporting procedure, and review-and-update log for tracking revisions after modifications, filter changes, and competent-person recertifications.
Worked example
A cabinet-making business in Sunshine operates three downdraft benches connected by ducting to a cyclone pre-separator and a cartridge dust collector on a mezzanine. The annual competent-person LEV service is scheduled for a Saturday using this SWMS. The competent person isolates the fan motor at the MCC, applies a personal lock and danger tag, waits 10 minutes for impeller spin-down, and verifies zero rotation through the observation port. Capture-velocity measurement at each downdraft bench returns below 1.0 m/s against the design specification of 1.5 m/s, confirming that the cartridges are at end of life. The technician dons P2 half-face respirator, Type 5/6 coveralls, and nitrile gloves, opens the cartridge housing, and changes the eight cartridges using a bag-in/bag-out procedure — each spent cartridge is sealed into a discharge bag before removal. The internal housing is HEPA-vacuumed before the new cartridges are installed. Because hardwood dust is combustible under AS/NZS 60079.10.2, intrinsically-safe torches are used throughout and no hot work is performed within 3 metres of the open housing for the duration. After reinstatement, the fan is restored, the capture velocity is remeasured and returns at 1.6 m/s, the test report is completed, and the LEV register is updated with the next annual due date.
Related legislation
- Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) — Section 19 primary duty of care; Section 27 officer due diligence; Section 36 notifiable incidents; industrial manslaughter provisions under 2024 amendments.
- WHS Regulation 2025 (NSW) — r. 49 air monitoring; r. 50 control of hazardous chemical exposure; r. 66-77 confined spaces; r. 200-224 plant and structures; r. 213 maintenance, inspection, cleaning; r. 298-300 SWMS for HRCW; r. 55A-55D psychosocial hazards.
- Dust Diseases Authority Act 2005 (NSW) — workers' compensation for workers exposed through LEV failure or inadequate maintenance.
- Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022 (Vic) and equivalents — hazardous-area classification and ignition-protection duties for combustible-dust systems.
- Environment Protection Act 1970/2017 (Vic) and state equivalents — disposal of filter-change waste through licensed streams.
- National Construction Code — ventilation and air-handling provisions for industrial buildings.
Frequently asked questions
How often must a dust-extraction system be tested?
AS/NZS 2243.8 and the general Part 4.5 maintenance duty under the WHS Regulation require annual capture-velocity, face-velocity, and static-pressure testing by a competent person. The test verifies that each hood or booth captures at its design velocity and that the system remains within its operating envelope. Results must be documented and retained for the life of the equipment. The 2024 Silica Code of Practice reinforces this annual cycle for any LEV serving silica-generating plant.
Does a fan motor isolation require lockout if I can see the impeller is stopped?
Yes. Visual confirmation of zero rotation is part of the verification but does not substitute for full electrical lockout. A worker who opens a fan housing relying only on visual stop is exposed to the risk that a remote control system, a timed cleaning cycle, or an operator error at the main panel restarts the fan while hands are inside the impeller zone. Apply a personal danger lock at the motor-control-centre feeder and verify zero-voltage with a calibrated meter before commencing work.
What respirator do I need during filter change?
Selection depends on the captured contaminant. A P2 half-face is the minimum for nuisance-dust systems; P3 half-face or full-face cartridge applies to silica, hardwood, and welding-fume systems; PAPR or supplied-air is required for asbestos, chromate, and confined-space entry with high residual dust. All tight-fitting respirators must be quantitatively fit tested per AS/NZS 1715:2009, and the worker must be clean-shaven at every fit interface. Reclassification of welding fume as a Group 1 carcinogen by Safe Work Australia in December 2024 has elevated RPE expectations for welding-fume LEV maintenance.
Is combustible-dust deflagration a real risk in Australian workshops?
Yes. Flour, sugar, wood, aluminium, magnesium, iron, and many plastic dusts are combustible under AS/NZS 60079.10.2 and have caused deflagrations in Australian bakeries, joinery shops, and metal-fabrication facilities. The highest-consequence international case remains the 2008 Imperial Sugar disaster in Georgia USA, but AS/NZS 60079.10.2 applies the same classification framework in Australia. LEV maintenance is a critical window because opening the containment exposes the accumulated dust layer and the airborne cloud to potential ignition from tools, torches, and static discharge.
When does dust-collector maintenance count as confined-space entry?
Whenever a worker places their head or body inside a vessel, duct run, or hopper that meets the AS 2865-2009 definition — enclosed space not designed for continuous human occupancy, limited entry and exit, and potential for hazardous atmosphere or engulfment. A filter change through a bag-in/bag-out port is generally not confined-space entry; entry through a manway to clean a baghouse floor or to inspect duct internals is. The confined-space permit-to-work with atmospheric testing and standby person applies whenever entry is unavoidable.
Is this SWMS compliant with the 1 July 2026 Section 26A changes?
Yes. From 1 July 2026, 34 approved Codes of Practice become legally binding under Section 26A of the amended WHS Act. This SWMS cites the currently-approved Codes that will become binding — Managing the Risks of Plant, Welding Processes, Abrasive Blasting, Managing Risks of Hazardous Chemicals, Confined Spaces, and the 2024 Silica Code — and aligns with AS/NZS 2243.8 and AS/NZS 60079.10.2 technical standards. No amendment is required for the 2026 transition; review is recommended at the 1 December 2026 WEL stepdown for silica (0.05 mg/m³ to 0.025 mg/m³) and whenever a served process changes its contaminant profile.